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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case.

A.

This case involves an easement dispute between neighbors, Dennis and Tracy Fitzpatrick as
Trustees, of their trust,

(“Fitzpatricks”),

The Dennis B.

Fitzpatrick

and Tracy L. Fitzpatrick Revocable Trust,

and Alan and Sherry Kent, as husband and Wife, and as Trustees, and their trust, The

Alan and Sherry Kent Living Trust Dated 11/07/2003, (“Kents”). Both
real property through revocable living trusts,

The easement, which was duly recorded,

and they are the

trustees

parties

own

their respective

0f such revocable living

trusts.

grants the Fitzpatricks the right t0 use, maintain, repair,

and

improve a portion 0f the Kents’ property, more speciﬁcally a pond area adjacent to the Fitzpatrick
property, in perpetuity.

The Kents

Fitzpatricks initiated a quiet

District

title

are challenging the validity 0f the recorded easement.

action t0

The

conﬁrm their easement rights and the Kents opposed. The

Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Kents, invalidating the easement.

This

appeal resulted.

Course 0f Proceedings.

B.

The

Fitzpatricks ﬁled their Complaint t0 Quiet Title

Title, Injunctive Relief,

were also named as potential defendants Who

(R., p. 7).

allegations

The Kents ﬁled

their
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Title,

The

real property.

13, 2018,

denying the

and Trespass/Ejectment

The Kents only counterclaimed

Dennis and Tracy Fitzpatrick were not named in

and Wife.

(R., pp. 6-55).

may have an interest in the Kents’

Answer and Counterclaim on November

(R., pp. 56-71).

2018, listing Quiet

and as husband and wife. John and Jane Does

and asserting claims for Declaratory Relief, Quiet

against the Fitzpatricks.

Trust;

19,

and Damages as causes 0f action against the Kents.

Fitzpatricks speciﬁcally named the Kents as Trustees

1- 1 0

0n October

against the Fitzpatrick

their individual capacities or as

husband

Three days after the Fitzpatricks filed their Answer and Counterclaim, the Kents filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment on November 16, 2018 (“Motion”), without having conducted any
discovery or fact finding in the case. (R., pp. 72-74). The Kents also filed their Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on November 16, 2018. (R., pp. 75-83). No supporting
affidavits or declarations accompanied the Motion. The Kents’ Motion narrowly focused on two
arguments: (1) a landowner cannot grant itself an easement, and (2) knowledge of a void
instrument does not create a real property right. (R., pp. 78-79). The Kents’ Motion did not include
their claim for damages. On November 19, 2018, the Kents filed a notice of hearing scheduling
oral argument on the Motion for December 18, 2018. (R., pp. 91-93).
On November 19, 2018, the Fitzpatricks filed their Answer to Counterclaim, denying the
claims in the Kents’ counterclaim. (R., pp. 84-90). The Answer to Counterclaim included
Affirmative Defenses alleging (1) the Easement Agreement was unambiguous, (2) the Kents had
actual knowledge of the recorded encumbrances on Lot 4, (3) the Fitzpatricks’ rights supersede
the Kents’ rights, (4) estoppel, waiver, laches, and unclean hands, and (5) the Kents’ claims are
barred as a result of their own intentional or negligent acts or omissions. (R., pp. 88-89).
On November 20, 2018, the Fitzpatricks filed their Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Cross Motion”). (R., pp. 94-95). Accompanying the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion were a
Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (R., pp. 95-113), the
Declaration of Dennis Fitzpatrick in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(R., pp. 114-166), and the Declaration of Terri Pickens Manweiler in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment (R., pp. 167-173). The Declaration of Dennis Fitzpatrick recited
the history of the property at issue in the lawsuit, it described the nature and background of the
pond easement, and the events that led to the Kents purchasing the property and their subsequent
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refusal to acknowledge the pond easement. (R., pp. 114-120). The Declaration of Terri Pickens
Manweiler authenticated public records confirming the ownership of the Fitzpatrick property,
including the appropriate legal descriptions therein. (R., pp. 167-168).
The Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion sought confirmation from the District Court that (1) the
Fitzpatricks had a valid express easement, (2) that the Fitzpatricks were entitled to maintain the
easement, (3) that the Kents could not obstruct the Fitzpatricks use of the easement, and (4) for
declaratory relief confirming that the Kents were not entitled to damages. (R., pp. 103-112). The
Fitzpatricks filed their Notice of Hearing Re: Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment on
November 20, 2018, scheduling the Fitzpatrick Cross Motion to be heard simultaneously with the
Kents’ Motion on December 18, 2018. (R., pp. 174-75).
On December 4, 2018, the Fitzpatricks filed Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 176-187). The Fitzpatricks also filed the Declaration of Dennis
Fitzpatrick in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on December 4, 2018.
(R., pp. 188-197). In the Opposition, the Fitzpatricks argued that the Kents’ Motion failed to
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by failing to rely on affidavits, declarations, or any
other sworn statements. (R., pp. 181-82). The Fitzpatricks further argued that the Kents
misinterpreted Idaho easement law, specifically that the easement was valid, and that the merger
doctrine did not apply to the pond easement. (R., pp. 182-84). Finally, the Fitzpatricks argued
that the Kents had actual knowledge of the pond easement, thus they could not be bona fide
purchasers free and clear of the easement. (R., p. 186). The Declaration of Dennis Fitzpatrick set
forth the purpose and intent of the Fitzpatricks in creating and recording the pond easement. (R.,
pp. 188-191).
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On December 4, 2018, the Kents filed their Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 192-201). The Kents reiterated their arguments
that (1) the Fitzpatricks could not grant themselves an easement, and (2) the easement was void as
to the Kents’ property rights. (R., pp. 194-95). The Kents then added the arguments that: (3) the
easement was ambiguous, and (4) the Fitzpatrick legal theories were not applicable to the pond
easement. (R., pp. 195-99). The Kents filed the Declaration of Alan Kent in opposition to the
Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion. (R., pp. 202-245). The Declaration of Alan Kent had no substantive
factual allegations; it merely authenticated the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CCRs”) of
Widgeon Lakes Estates Subdivision, not mentioning why the CCRs were relevant or applicable to
the summary judgment motions. (R., p. 203).
On December 6, 2018, the District Court entered the Scheduling Order for the case. (R.,
pp. 246-249). The matter was scheduled for a court trial to commence October 1, 2019. (R., p.
246).
The Fitzpatricks filed their Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Plaintiff’s Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 10, 2018. (R., pp. 250-57). The following day, the
Kents filed their Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R., pp. 258-272). The
District Court heard oral argument on the cross motions for summary judgment on December 18,
2018. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 3). The Fitzpatricks argued their Cross Motion first (Tr., Vol. I, p. 4) and the
Kents argued their Motion second (Tr., Vol. I, p. 22).
On December 31, 2018, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (“Memorandum Decision”). (R., pp. 273-289).
Summarily, the District Court held (1) the Kents’ motion for summary judgment was not
procedurally infirm (R., pp. 276-77), and (2) the pond easement is invalid. (R., pp. 277-287).
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Specifically, the District Court held that the merger doctrine invalidated the pond easement. (R.,
pp. 278-282). The District Court denied the Kents’ Motion as it related to their trespass damages
counterclaim because Kents failed to put forth any factual allegations that would entitle them to
the relief sought. (R., p. 275, fn. 2).
In order to avoid a trial prior to appeal, the parties entered into a Stipulation and Joint
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on February 14, 2019. (R., pp. 290-302). The Fitzpatricks
reserved the right to pursue this appeal and the Kents reserved the right to seek an award of costs
and attorney’s fees. (R., p. 291). That same day, the District Court entered its Order Approving
Stipulation and Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. (R., pp. 303-05). The District Court
also entered Judgment on February 14, 2019, consistent with the stipulation. (R., pp. 306-09). On
February 21, 2019, the Fitzpatricks timely filed their Notice of Appeal. (R., pp. 310-14).
On February 25, 2019, the Kents filed their Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements, and
Attorney’s Fees (R., pp. 315-18), a Brief in Support of Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements,
and Attorney’s Fees (R., pp. 319-326), and the Declaration of Dylan Lawrence (R., pp. 327-340).
Shortly thereafter, the Kents filed an Amended Verified Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements,
and Attorney’s Fees, to add the verification signature to the document. (R., pp. 341-45). The
Kents sought attorney’s fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121, alleging the Fitzpatricks’ lawsuit
was frivolous and without foundation. (R., p. 321).
On February 26, 2019, the Fitzpatricks filed their Motion to Disallow Memorandum of
Costs, Disbursements, and Attorney’s Fees (R., pp. 346-47), the Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements, and Attorney’s Fees (R., pp. 348356), the Declaration of Terri Pickens Manweiler in Support of Motion to Disallow Memorandum
of Costs, Disbursements, and Attorney’s Fees (R., pp. 357-360), and a Notice of Hearing on the
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Motion to Disallow (R., pp. 361-62). The Fitzpatricks argued that the Kents were not entitled to
disbursements and attorney’s fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 or Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(e)(2). (R., p. 349-351). The Fitzpatricks further argued that even if the Kents were
entitled to recover fees, the fees sought were unreasonably excessive for the matter. (R., pp. 35255).
On March 11, 2019, the Kents filed their Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Disallow. (R., pp. 363-69). The matter was heard before the District Court on March
19, 2019. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 3). The District Court heard oral argument from both parties then issued
its oral ruling from the bench. The District Court concluded, “I conclude that there was enough to
support Plaintiffs’ arguments in the case that the case was not brought frivolously, unreasonably,
or without foundation, so I am going to deny the request for attorney fees under 12-121.” (Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 14, ll. 20-24).
On March 19, 2019, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment, awarding costs as a
matter of right to the Kents in the amount of $136.00. (R., pp. 370-72). On April 18, 2019, the
Kents filed their Notice of Cross Appeal, appealing the denial of an award of attorney fees. (R.,
pp. 377-385). The Amended Judgment has since been satisfied as to the $136.00 cost award to the
Kents.
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C.

Concise Statement 0f Facts.
In January of 1996, the

Widgeon Lakes

was ﬁnalized With Ada County and

Estates Subdivision

(“Widgeon Lakes”)

The subdivision

the City of Eagle, Idaho.

plat

plat

map

was duly

recorded on February 15, 1996, in the ofﬁcial records 0f Ada County, Idaho, as Instrument N0.

96013037.

(R., pp. 121-23).

Widgeon Lakes

consists of fourteen residential lots

The Eagle City Council approved Widgeon Lakes on January

(R., pp. 121-22).

Ada County Commissioners approved on February
recorded plat

map of Widgeon Lakes

14, 1996.

(R., p. 123).

and two ponds.
and the

10, 1996,

The approved and

sets forth:

1. BUILDING SETBACKS AND DIMENSIONAL STANDARDS IN THIS
SUBDIVISION SHALL BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE
ZONING REGULATIONS OF ADA COUNTY.

2.

ANY RESUBDIVISION OF

THIS PLAT SHALL

CONFORM TO THE

APPLICABLE ZONING REGULATIONS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF
RESUBDIVISION.
(R., p. 123).

For a clearer View of the Notes from the Widgeon Lakes plat map, see Appendix A,

attached hereto.

On May

31, 1996, the

owners 0f Widgeon Lakes executed the Widgeon Lakes Estates

Declaration of Restrictive Covenants (“CCRS”). (R., pp. 206-244). The

With

Ada County

membership

Recorder’s Ofﬁce. (R.,

unit per

severance of interests in

On

0r about

(R., p. 215).

lot.

The CCRs

Widgeon Lakes.

March of 1997,

p. 206).

In the

CCRs, owners 0f each

further restrict

the Fitzpatricks acquired

more

have one

lot splitting, partitioning, or

title

to a parcel

of real property

particularly described as Lot 3 in

0f Widgeon Lakes Estates Subdivision, ﬁled in Book 71 of

Ada County,

any

lot

(R., p. 228).

located at 41 19 Park Lane, Eagle, Idaho, 83616,

ofﬁcial records 0f

CCRs were duly recorded

State 0f Idaho (“Lot 3”).

construct their residence,

which they did shortly thereafter.
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Plats, at

The

Block

1

Pages 7265 through 7267,

Fitzpatricks purchased Lot 3 t0

On or about April 28, 1997, the Fitzpatricks acquired title to a parcel of real property
adjacent to Lot 3, more particularly described as Lot 4 in Block 1 of Widgeon Lakes Estates
Subdivision, filed in Book 71 of Plats, at Pages 7265 through 7267, official records of Ada County,
State of Idaho (“Lot 4”). The Fitzpatricks also later purchased Lot 5 in Block 1 of Widgeon Lakes,
but that lot is not the subject of this dispute. A large pond exists on portions of Lot 3 and Lot 4,
as identified in Appendix B, attached hereto. (R., p. 123).
In April of 1997, after acquiring Lot 4, the Fitzpatricks constructed a vinyl fence over a
portion of Lot 3 and Lot 4, enclosing access to the large pond and reserving it for Lot 3. (R., p.
115). The Fitzpatricks also installed landscaping and an irrigation system on Lot 4, adjacent to the
large pond. (R., p. 115). The vinyl fence is a view fence so that the pond is visible from all areas
of Lots 3 and 4, as identified in Appendix C attached hereto. (R., p. 161). The vinyl fence encloses
Lot 4 without the pond area.
In 2012, the Fitzpatricks formed The Fitzpatrick Revocable Trust (“Fitzpatrick Trust”) and
on July 30, 2012, the Fitzpatricks conveyed their interest in Lots 3, 4, and 5 to the Fitzpatrick
Trust. (R., p. 171). The Fitzpatricks never tried to merge title to Lots 3 and 4 and they never
contacted Ada County or the City of Eagle to accomplish the same. (R., p. 190). The Fitzpatricks
never intended to merge their interests in Lots 3 and 4. (R., p. 189). Likewise, the Fitzpatricks
never attempted to go through the subdivision process to legally merge Lots 3 and 4. (R., p. 190).
Finally, the Fitzpatricks did not try to merge Lots 3 and 4 within Widgeon Lakes as restricted by
the CCRs. (R., p. 190).
After decades of ownership of Lot 4, in or around August of 2016, the Fitzpatricks decided
to sell Lot 4 to a third-party buyer. In order to preserve the right to access and maintain the
landscaping adjacent to the large pond on Lot 4, the Fitzpatricks caused the area to be surveyed by
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Tealey’s Land Surveying to create a pond easement in favor of Lot 3 over Lot 4. (R., p. 189). On
or about August 22, 2016, Tealey’s Land Surveying created a legal description for the pond
easement. (R., p. 125).
On September 9, 2016, the Fitzpatricks executed a non-exclusive Easement Agreement,
granting a pond easement to the owners of Lot 3 over and across Lot 4 (the “Easement
Agreement”), reserving a right to use, benefit from, and enjoy the pond, the property surrounding
the pond, along with the right to maintain, repair and improve the pond property (the “Pond
Easement”). (R., p. 116). The Easement Agreement was recorded on September 12, 2016, as Ada
County Instrument Number 2016-085988. (R., pp. 116, 127-132).
The Easement Agreement sets forth an easement between two separate and distinct
subdivision lots, Lot 3 and Lot 4 of Widgeon Lakes. The Easement Agreement sets forth in
relevant part:
1.3
Pond Easement. The Grantor Real Property and Benefited Real
Property share a common pond and Grantee has requested the Grantor to convey to
the Grantee a nonexclusive easement on a portion of the Grantor Real Property in
favor of the Benefited Real Property for the purposes described in Section 2.2
below. The portion of the Grantor Real Property that has been requested for the
easement is described on Exhibit C attached (the “Easement Real Property”).
1.4
Purpose of Agreement. The purpose of this Easement Agreement
are (i) to describe the easement granted, and (ii) to establish the relative rights and
obligations of the parties regarding the easement granted under this Agreement.
…
2.2
Purpose of Easement. The Pond Easement is granted for the use,
benefit, and enjoyment of the pond, the property surrounding the pond as set forth
in Exhibit C, and also for the right to maintain, repair, and improve the Easement
Real Property.
2.3
Term of Easement. The term of this Easement Agreement is
perpetual and shall run with the land.
2.4
Covenants and Agreements of the Grantor. The Grantor, on
behalf of the Grantor and the Grantor’s heir, successors, assigns, purchasers, or
transferee of any kind, covenants and agrees with the Grantee and the Grantee’s
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heirs, successors, assigns, purchasers, or transferee

of this Easement Agreement
Property, and
equity)

by an owner of all

Easement Agreement

On
listed

(ii)

(i)

shall

shall inure to the

or part of,

0f any kind, that the provisions

run with the land and bind the Easement Real

beneﬁt 0f, and be enforceable
the Beneﬁted Real Property.

(at

law or

in

(R., pp. 127-132).

September

12, 2016, after the

Lot 4 for sale on the multiple

listing speciﬁcally stated,

Easement Agreement was recorded, the Fitzpatricks

listing service (the

“‘MLS”).

(R., pp. 116, 134).

“This property has a recorded easement on north side.

New

The

MLS

owner

will

be allowed View but Vinyl fencing and pond Will remain attached t0 and maintained by adjacent
property.” (R., pp. 116, 134).

Alan Kent

that the

The

listing agent,

Pond Easement was

Tracy Brault, speciﬁcally and verbally notiﬁed

controlled and maintained as part 0f the Fitzpatricks’

property, Lot 3. (R., p. 116).

On December

15,

2016, the Kents and the Fitzpatricks entered into a RE-24 Vacant Land

Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement for Lot 4 (“RE-24”).

24 speciﬁcally
(R., p. 137).

states,

acknowledging and accepting the terms

set forth therein.

RE-24, the Kents elected not t0 inspect the property

commitment regarding any encumbrances 0n Lot
following requirement related to the

...

The RE-

“Buyers are aware of a recorded easement on the north side 0f the property.”

Both Alan and Sherry Kent signed the RE-24,

SELLER

(R., pp. 117, 136-141).

shall furnish t0

title

4.

initialing

each page of the agreement,

(R., pp. 136-141).

(R., p. 137),

(R., p.

As

indicated in the

but they did receive a

138).

The RE-24 included

commitment:

BUYER a preliminary commitment 0f a title insurance

policy showing the condition 0f title t0 said PROPERTY, BUYER shall have 2
after receipt 0f the preliminary commitment, within which to
business days
object in writing t0 the condition of the title as set forth in the preliminary
commitment. If BUYER does not so object, BUYER shall be deemed t0 have
accepted the conditions 0f the title.

(R., p. 138)

(emphasis added).
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title

the

At

that time the Vinyl fence

against the

title

t0

Lot

was on Lot 4 and

the

Easement Agreement was recorded

Closing 0n Lot 4 took place on 0r about March 15, 2017, and a warranty

4.

deed, subject t0 easements 0f record,

was executed

0f the Kents.

in favor

(R., p. 117).

The

warranty deed included the following language:

T0 have and
Grantee,

its

t0

hold the said premises, with their appurtenances unto the said

heirs

and assigns forever.

And

the said Granter does hereby covenant

owner in fee simple 0f said
encumbrances except those t0 Which this
conveyance is expressly made subiect and those made, suffered or done by the
Grantee; and subiect t0 all existing patent reservations, easements, right(s) 0f way,
protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and applicable building codes, laws and
regulations, general taxes and assessments, including irrigation and utility
assessments (if any) for the current year, Which are not due and payable, and that
Granter will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
t0

and With the said Grantee,

that Grantor is the

premises; that they are free from

Whenever
(R., p. 173)

all

the context so requires, the singular

number

includes the plural.

(emphasis added). At the time 0f closing, the Vinyl fence had been on Lot 4 for 20

years. (R., p. 117).

At some point

thereafter, the

Kents met with the president 0f the Widgeon Lakes Estates

Subdivision Homeowner’s Association and inquired about their rights to the Pond Easement. The
president notiﬁed the Kents that the Easement

comply With

the terms

Agreement encumbered Lot 4 and the Kents must

and conditions of the Easement Agreement.

0f 2018, the Kents started excavating and construction on Lot

making modiﬁcations

to the

4.

Pond Easement, including removing

(R., p. 117).

At

On or about July

that time, the

Kents began

a portion 0f the fence and the

existing irrigation system. (R., p. 118).

On July 3 1,
them

that the

2018, the Fitzpatricks caused t0 be served on the Kents a legal

Pond Easement was

and the Kents were not
(R., pp.

the

1

18, 143- 1 57).

Pond Easement

entitled to

letter notifying

controlled and maintained with the Fitzpatrick Property (Lot 3)

make any modiﬁcations t0 the Vinyl fence 0r the Pond Easement.

On September 0f20 1 8, the Fitzpatricks installed an irrigation system Within

to replace the irrigation
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system impaired by the Kents.

(R., p. 118).

The

Fitzpatricks also installed a gate along the vinyl fence, allowing access by the Kents to the Pond
Easement. (R., p. 118). The cost of the irrigation system and replaced landscaping exceeded
$5,275.00 and the cost of the gate was approximately $507.00. (R., p. 118). On October 12, 2018,
the Kents caused to be served on the Fitzpatricks a legal letter rejecting the Easement Agreement
and further threatening to remove the vinyl fence and all of the newly installed irrigation system
on the Pond Easement. (R., pp. 118, 159).

On October 19, 2018, the Fitzpatricks filed the

Complaint to Quiet Title to resolve the Pond Easement dispute.
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ISSUE PRESENTED

II.

Did

1.

ON APPEAL

the District Court err in denying Appellant’s motion for

judgment, while granting Respondent’s motion for

summary

summary judgment,

ﬁnding the easement void as a matter of law?

ARGUMENT

III.

A. Standard 0f Review.

On

decision de novo but apply the

same standard used by

The David and Marvel Benton Trust
-Traska

v.

v.

A

LLC v.

v.

v.

the

Camel]

v.

Barker Management,

382 P.3d 342, (2016);

Wescott, 160 Idaho 893,

1);

Stewart Title Guar. C0., 149 Idaho 437, 441, 235 P.3d 387, 391 (2010).

grant of

any material

on the motion.

Teton View Golestates, LLC, 152 Idaho 401, 404, 272 P.3d 373, 376 (201

summary judgment

warranted Where the pleadings, depositions and

is

admissions on ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits,

56(c).

the district court in ruling

Valley View Ina, 138 Idaho 497, 65 P.3d 519 (2003);

Idaho Dev,

appellate courts review the

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 384 P.3d 392, (2016); McColm-

Ina, 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 (2002); Kirk

Mortensen

summary judgment,

appeal from the grant of a motion for

fact

and

When making

nonmoving

its

party.

Cascade Auto Glass,

that the

moving party

is

if any,

show

entitled to

judgment

determination, the Court construes

The David and Marvel Benton

Inc.

v.

Idaho Farm Bureau

Ins.

that there is

n0 genuine issue

as to

as a matter of law. I.R.C.P.

all facts in

the light

Trust, 161 Idaho at 150,

most favorable
384 P.3d

at

to

397;

Ca, 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753

(2005).

As

a general rule, the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences contained in

the existing record in favor 0f the

nonmoving

party.

There

is,

however, a limited exception t0 the

application of this rule in cases, such as this one, where the matter

Without a jury.

In such cases, the judge
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is

is t0

be

tried before the court

not constrained t0 draw inferences in favor of the party

opposing a motion for summary judgment. Rather the judge
inferences to be

drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary

Richie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982).

is

most probable

free t0 arrive at the

Riverside Development C0.

facts.

Further, the legal standard

by which

v.

the

court considers cross—motions for

summary judgment allows

inferences from the record before

because the parties have essentially agreed n0 factual issues

it

exist.

Where the parties have ﬁled cross-motions

issues

and

for

district court

v.

Brown

v.

fact

Peacock, 133

v.

Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191, 923 P.2d

Haley, 124 Idaho 870, 872, 865 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). Additionally,

because both parties are moving the court for an order 0n the same issue, the court
all

facts,

no genuine issue 0f material

from entering summary judgment. Davis

Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999) (citing
434, 436 (1996); Morrissey

draw reasonable

summaryjudgment relying on the same

theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is

Which would preclude the

the court t0

reasonable inferences from the record in favor 0f either party. See,

e.g.,

is

free to

draw

Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119

Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).

However, the mere
itself establish that there is

fact that

both parties

move

no genuine issue of material

for

summary judgment does not

fact.

Banner Life Ins. C0.

v.

Dixson Irrevocable Tn, 147 Idaho 117, 123, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009); Kromrei
110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986) (citing Casey
507, 600 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1979)).

The

fact that the parties

v.

Highlands

Ins. C0,,

v.

in

and of

Mark Wallace

AID Ins.

C0.,

100 Idaho 505,

have ﬁled cross—motions for summary

judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and the court must evaluate each
party’s

(2000);

motion 0n

its

own merits. Staﬂord v.

Bear Island Water Ass’n, Ina,

Intermountain Forest Mgmt.
(2001).
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v.

v.

Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119

Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994);

Louisiana-Paciﬁc Corp, 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923

B. Issue 0n Appeal

The

District

Court erred When

it

granted the Kents’ Motion for

denied the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion for
valid express easement over Lot 4; (2)

Summary Judgment because

the

Summary Judgment and

(1) the Fitzpatricks

Easement Agreement created a

restrictive

have a

covenant

over Lot 4; (3) the Kents are estopped from extinguishing the equitable servitude against Lot 4;
(4)

merger of

title

did not occur between Lots 3 and 4; (5) the Kents had record notice 0f the

recorded easement and are not bona ﬁde purchasers for value; (6) the Fitzpatricks have a right and
a duty to maintain the

Pond Easement;

(7) the

Kents took Lot 4 subject t0 the encumbrances,

preventing them from interfering with 0r obstructing the Fitzpatricks’ use 0f the Pond Easement;

and (8) the Kents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and opposition t0 the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion
for

Summary Judgment

fail for

lack afﬁrmative facts in support of their motion and lack of any

genuine issues 0f material fact opposing the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion.

The Easement

1.

The

District

is

a Valid Express Easement

Court erred When

Fitzpatricks have a valid

it

denied the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion because the

and enforceable Pond Easement. The Fitzpatricks created a valid express

easement when they executed the Easement Agreement.

T0 properly convey an

express easement, the easement must be in writing t0 comply with

the statute 0f frauds. LC. § 9-503;

66 P.3rd 798 (2002); Fajen
v.

v.

Sun Valley Land and Minerals

v.

Hawkes, 138 Idaho 543, 547,

Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 629, 533 P.2d 746 (1975)(citing McReynolds

Harrigﬁeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P.2d 1096 (1914)).

The Idaho code provides

A

that

easements pass With real property. The statute reads:

transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto,

same manner and

to the

obviously and permanently used by the
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in

Whose estate is
same extent as such property was
person whose estate is transferred, for the

favor thereof an easement t0 use other real property of the person
transferred, in the

and creates

benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.
I.C. § 55-603.
When construing an instrument that conveys an interest in land, effect should be given to
the intent of the parties to the transaction. Daugharty v. Post Falls Hwy. Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735,
9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000). See also Nelson v. Johnson, 106 Idaho 385, 387, 679 P.2d 662, 664 (1984);
Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 246, 270 P.2d 825, 829 (1954). The intent of the parties is
determined by viewing the conveyance instrument as a whole. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has
stated:
In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the easement
is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted. Moreover, a
majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that the easement
owner is entitled to do such things as are reasonably necessary for the use of the
easement.
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880, (1991). If the deed is plain and
unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be ascertained from the deed itself. Phillips Industries, Inc.
v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 697, 827 P.2d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 1992). Interpretation of an
unambiguous instrument is a question of law to be settled by its plain language. City of Kellogg v.
Mission Mt. Interests, Co., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000).
The Easement Agreement is an express easement by reservation; the Fitzpatricks created
the Pond Easement purely to reserve a portion of Lot 4 prior to selling it. (R., p. 116). The date
the Easement Agreement was recorded is the same date Lot 4 was listed on the MLS, showing that
the Fitzpatricks did not intend to simply have an easement over two lots they owned, but instead,
to sell one of the lots but maintain an equitable interest in a portion of Lot 4. Thus, when the
Fitzpatricks executed the Easement Agreement, they encumbered Lot 4 for the non-exclusive
benefit of Lot 3. When the Easement Agreement was recorded, it became an encumbrance on Lot
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4,

allowing the owners of Lot

3, in perpetuity, t0 use,

maintain, repair, and improve the

Pond

Easement.

The Kents argued that the Easement Agreement was ambiguous,
not describe or identify

in original).

how the Fitzpatricks may use the Kents’

The Easement Agreement

stating the language “does

property.” (R., p. 196) (emphasis

states:

Purpose 0f Easement. The Pond Easement is granted for the use, beneﬁt,
and enj oyment of the pond, the property surrounding the pond as set forth in Exhibit
C, and also for the right to maintain, repair, and improve the Easement Real

2.2

Property.

(R., p. 127). Exhibit

the

Pond Easement.

C

to the

Easement Agreement

(R., p. 132).

and the Easement Agreement

is

would

it is

bounds

legal description

Where the Pond Easement

is

0f

located,

a non—exclusive easement, so the Kents could also

The Kents seem t0 want the Easement Agreement to deﬁne how

“use, maintain, repair, or improve” the

are not necessary Within the four corners 0f the

clearly set forth within the document, the

repair,

the metes and

clearly identiﬁable

clear that

enj 0y the large pond. (R., p. 127).

the owners of Lot 3

It is

is

Pond Easement, deﬁnitions

Easement Agreement. The

owners of Lot

3, quite literally,

intent

that

of the grantor

is

intend t0 use, maintain,

and improve the Pond Easement.

The Easement Agreement

is

unambiguous, was duly recorded With Ada County, and was

0f record notice when the Kents took ownership possession of Lot

4.

Thus, this Court, acting in

place of the District Court, can determine as a matter of law that the Easement Agreement

unambiguous,

valid,

Fitzpatricks raising

and enforceable against the Kents and

all

future

owners of Lot

and arguing the unambiguity 0f the Easement Agreement, the

failed t0 address the issue in

its

17

Despite

District Court

decision. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court

and afﬁrm the Fitzpatricks’ Pond Easement.
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is

2.

The Easement Created a

The Easement Agreement
against Lot 4.

is

The owners 0f Lot 4,

3 as a condition

Restrictive

Covenant 0n Lot 4

an express easement that also serves as a restrictive covenant

in perpetuity,

must not obstruct the

a contractual obligation that relates t0 the ownership and/or

is

use and enjoyment of real property. Although covenants generally

law.

An

0f the owners of Lot

of that restrictive covenant.

In simple terms, a covenant

contract law,

rights

fall

within the province of

when attached to real property, covenants are construed within the context ofproperty

easement

is

the right t0 use the land of another.

that in both cases, the use

0f land

is

Covenants are similar

easements in

t0

being restricted 0r enhanced by an obligation

owed by

the

property owner t0 another party. Restrictive covenants differ from easements in that they are not

considered ownership interests in land; real covenants are agreements and thus can only be created

by promises. Once

in existence, there is little practical difference

between a negative easement and

a restrictive covenant.

When

a court interprets a restrictive covenant,

construction as are applied t0 any contract 0r covenant.

P.2d 434, 438 (1996); Sun Valley
(1984); Smith

clear

v.

Ctr.

v.

Sun Valley

it is

t0 apply generally the

Brown

v.

C0,, 107 Idaho 41

Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 147, 350 P.2d 348, 351 (1960).

City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P.2d 41

Where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the
question of fact.

Paul Properly

St.

Clair

& Liab.

v.

question of Whether a contract

18

1,

is

1,

413, 690 P.2d 346, 348

Where

contract terms are

a question of law. City 0f

414 (1995).

On the

interpretation of the contract’s

other hand,

meaning

Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 704, 769 P.2d 579, 581 (1989); Clark

Ins. Cos.,
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Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 193, 923

and unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract’s meaning

Chubbuck v.

same

is

is

a

v. St.

102 Idaho 756, 757, 639 P.2d 454, 455 (1981). The preliminary

ambiguous,

is

a question of law over Which this Court exercises

free review. City

ofChubbuck, 127 Idaho

at

201, 899 P.2d at 414; Post

v.

Murphy, 125 Idaho 473,

475, 873 P.2d 118, 120 (1994).

A restrictive covenant
interpretation

necessary.

0n a given

Where

there

is

ambiguous When

is

issue.

It is

it

is

capable 0f more than one reasonable

only if an ambiguity

no ambiguity, there

is

found that any “construction”

is

is

n0 room for construction; the plain meaning of

the language governs. Brown, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 P.2d at 438.

The Easement Agreement recognizes, within
Agreements of the Grantor.”

(R., p. 127).

the

document,

“Covenants

The Idaho Supreme Court conﬁrmed

covenants were enforceable as t0 subsequent purchasers of property. West

v.

the

and

that restrictive

Wood Investments,

Inc.

Accord, 141 Idaho 75, 106 P.3d 401 (2005). The Court held:
This

case

Whether common area allegedly created by a
establish an equitable interest in persons who purchase a

addresses

developer/mortgagor
unit in the project,

may

and whether such

mortgagee’s successor in

interests

are

enforceable against the

interest.

Equitable enforcement 0f covenants restricting the use 0f land was recognized

common law

of England after the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Streets
Developing C0., 898 P.2d 377, 379 (Wy0.1995). Equitable
servitudes are distinguished from covenants running With the land in that the latter
should be of record, and a buyer takes with constructive knowledge, if not actual
knowledge, of the existence 0f such recorded covenants and is thereby bound t0 the
in the
v.

J

M Land

&

covenants. In Streets

The question

it is

stated:

on whether the covenant
if there was a mere agreement and no covenant [running with
runs With the land
the land], this court would enforce it against the party purchasing With notice of it;
for if an equity is attached to the property bV the owner, no one purchasing with
notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from Who he
purchased. 1d,, 898 P.2d at 379-80 (quoting Tulk v. Moxhay (1948), 2 Ph. 774 (41
[0f enforceability] does not depend

Eng. Rep. 1143)).

West Wood,

at 84-85,

The Kents

106 P.3d

at

410-1

1.

(Emphasis added).

incorrectly assert that the

Easement Agreement

in this case is void as a matter

0f law and does not contain a restrictive covenant attached to Lot 4. The Kents base
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their incorrect

assertion that the

Easement Agreement

and equitable servitudes are
fails to

all

the contrary, the

void on the idea that easements, restrictive covenants,

mutually exclusive, and that the Easement Agreement in

meet any of the requirements

To

is

for a valid

and enforceable agreement.

Easement Agreement not only

this case

(R., pp. 197-99).1

creates a right (an easement in favor 0f

Lot 3 for the use, enjoyment, and beneﬁt 0f a portion 0f Lot 4 — the Pond Easement), the Easement

Agreement

also creates a restriction

0n the owners of Lot 4

use of the Pond Easement by owners 0f Lot
as an afﬁrmative

herein, the

easement

ﬂi a restrictive

Easement Agreement

is

clear

3).

(the

In this case, the

owners of Lot 4 cannot

Easement Agreement was drafted

covenant encumbering Lot

and unambiguous, and

The Grantor, 0n behalf of the Grantor and

restrict

As

4.

stated previously

states as follows:

the Grantor’s heirs, successors, assigns,

purchasers, 0r transferee 0f any kind, covenants and agrees With the Grantee and
the Grantee’s heirs, successors, assigns, purchasers, 0r transferee 0f any kind,

M

Easement Agreement (i) shall run With and bind the Easement
Real Property, and (ii) shall inure to the beneﬁt 0f, and be enforceable (at law 0r in
equity) by any owner of all or part 0f, the Beneﬁted Real Property.
the provisions of this

(R., p. 127)

(emphasis added). The covenants Within the Easement Agreement are enforceable as

to all subsequent

owners 0f Lot

4,

The Easement Agreement

including the Kents.

in this case is clear

and unambiguous,

it

includes both an

afﬁrmative easement (express easement) and a negative easement (restrictive covenant). Despite

being argued by Fitzpatricks, the District Court failed to analyze the applicability of restrictive
covenants t0 this case, rather, the District Court dismissed the concept in a footnote. (R.,

The record

is

clear,

Agreement; thus,
entitled to

1

The Kents

the quiet

this

judgment

n0 genuine issues 0f material

fact existed t0 invalidate the

Easement

Court should reverse the District Court and ﬁnd that the Fitzpatricks are

as a matter of law

conﬁrming the Pond Easement.

further incorrectly allege that the Fitzpatricks did not raise these claims initially. (R., p. 197).

title

p. 278).

claim, along with

all

0f the Fitzpatricks’ afﬁrmative defenses, put the Kents 0n notice,

notice pleading state, that the Fitzpatricks
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would

rely

0n these various

legal theories.

T0

all that is

the contrary, both

required in this

3.

The Kents are Estopped from

An

enforceable equitable servitude cucumbers Lot 4 for the use and beneﬁt 0f Lot

Nullifving the Equitable Servitude 0n Lot 4

3.

The

Kents cannot nullify or extinguish the equitable servitude as suggested in their summary judgment

motion 0r the

District Court’s

An equitable

servitude

Memorandum Decision.
is

an agreement between two or more parties that

restricts the right

of use 0r enjoyment of one 0r more parcels 0f property that can be enforced through equity.
promise that

restricts the

use 0f land in some

way

that is designed t0

It is

a

be enforced with speciﬁc

performance, rather than with monetary damages. In other words, While covenants are usually
enforced by the awarding of monetary damages t0 the aggrieved party, equitable servitudes are
enforced with an injunction preventing the use of the property in the manner that

is

proscribed

by

the servitude.

Equitable servitudes that are designated in a plat or duly recorded can create restrictions 0n

use of encumbered property. The Idaho Supreme Court in West
equitable servitudes.

The Court

Equitable interests

may

Wood Investments

also discussed

stated:

arise

because 0f the actions 0f the

parties,

such as oral

Lake Cascade, Ina, 110 Idaho 909, 913, 719 P.2d
1169, 1173 (1986) (Middlekauﬂ II). In Middlekauﬁ’ v. Lake Cascade, Ina, 103
Idaho 832, 654 P.2d 1385 (1982) (Middlekauffl), this court established the test

representations. Middlekauﬁ’v.

relevant to determining if a promise regarding the use 0f land runs against a

successor in interest of the original promisor: 1) whether or not the party claiming
the enforceable interest actually has an interest against the original promisor; and
2) if such right exists, Whether

Middlekauﬂl, 103 Idaho

at

it is

enforceable against the subsequent purchaser.

834-35, 654 P.2d at 1387-88.

The evidence adduced at trial includes a “record of survey” 0f Lot 5. This
document was recorded with Kootenai County on May 10, 1997 and marks the
substantial portion 0f Lot 5 as “common area.” West Wood took APP’s interest in
the property at issue 0n December 15, 1997. West Wood is charged with notice of
this recorded document and that this area was designated as common area.
141 Idaho at 86, 106 P.3d at 412 (emphasis added).
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In this case, the Kents rely
’

Homeowners Assoc, Ina,
Agreement

sale

v.

Willow Creek Ranch Estates N0. 2 Subdivision

_ Idaho _, 431 P.3d 4 (2018)

not an equitable servitude against Lot

is

from the case
and

0n Lee

at

4.

The

for the proposition that the

facts

ofLee

are

Easement

Wholly distinguishable

hand. In Lee, the plaintiffs were relying on language in an unrecorded purchase

agreement t0 establish rights for ingress and egress t0

their real property.

The

trial

court

ruled that the Lees did not have an easement, nor did they acquire rights under the doctrine of
equitable servitudes.

for an

The Idaho Supreme Court afﬁrmed the

district court

and held that Lees’ claim

easement failed because the agreement was merged into the warranty deed, there was n0

language granting easement rights within the deed, and they did not have any previously preserved

easement

rights.

The case
Court clearly

hand more closely resembles West Wood Investments. The Idaho Supreme

at

stated:

A purchaser is

charged with every fact shown by the records and is presumed to
know every other fact Which an examination suggested by the records would have
disclosed. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195-96, 3O P.3d 970, 973-74 (2001)

Cordova v. Hood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 1, 21 L.Ed. 587 (1872); Northwestern
Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 19 S.Ct. 36, 43 L.Ed. 307 (1898)). “This Court has
stated: ‘One Who purchases 0r encumbrances With notice of inconsistent claims
(Citing

who fails t0 investigate the open and obvious
good faith.” Middlekauﬂll, 110 Idaho at 916,
1176 (quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 P.2d 178,

does not take in good

faith,

and one

inconsistent claim cannot take in

719 P.2d at
180 (1974)).

West Wood, 141 Idaho

at 84-85,

106 P.3d

In this case, and unlike the

at

410-11 (emphasis added).

Lee purchase and

sale agreement, the

Easement Agreement was

properly executed and duly recorded prior to the Kents purchase 0f Lot

Agreement both confers a
Easement, and

it

right for the

restricts the
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owners of Lot 3

t0 use, enjoy,

4.

The Easement

and maintain the Pond

owners 0f Lot 4 from interfering With the use by the owners 0f Lot 3

over the Pond Easement. There is simply no comparison between the facts and issues set forth in
Lee and the case at hand.
Furthermore, the Kents not only had constructive knowledge of the Easement Agreement,
they had actual knowledge when they contractually agreed to be bound by the terms of the
Easement Agreement in the RE-24, thus they are estopped from taking a position contrary to
accepting the Easement Agreement as part of their purchase of Lot 4. (R., p. 137).
In this case, in its Memorandum Decision, the District Court relied on a Florida case,
Hensel v. Aurilio, 417 So.2d 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), for the proposition that one cannot
grant an easement to oneself. (R., p. 280). While Hensel does suggest this standard proposition, it
also clarifies that there are exceptions to the general rule. Id. at 1037-38. The court in Hensel
held:
Equitable estoppel, so far as it relates to the trial of title to land, is a doctrine by
which a party is prevented from setting up his legal title because he has through his
acts, words, or silence led another to take a position in which the assertion of the
legal title would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
If one man knowingly, though he does it passively by looking on, suffers another
to purchase and expend money on land under an erroneous opinion of title, without
making his claim, he shall not afterwards be permitted to exercise his legal right
against such person. … Coram v. Palmer, 63 Fla. 116, 58 So. 721, 722.
…
In addition, we equate “sneaky and deceitful” with “unclean hands”; therefore,
appellee’s efforts to enforce his easement should have been frustrated by
application of the clean hands doctrine. “Equity will stay its hand where a party is
guilty of conduct condemned by honest and reasonable men. Unscrupulous
practices, overreaching, concealment, trickery or other unconscientous [sic]
conduct are sufficient to bar relief.” 22 Fla.Jur.2d, Equity, § 50.
Id. at 1038.
In this case, the Kents were informed about the Easement Agreement in the MLS listing,
by the listing agent, and in the RE-24. The Kents had ample opportunity to challenge the validity
of the Easement Agreement with the Fitzpatricks at that time. Instead, the Kents executed the RE-
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24, did not question the physical presence of the Vinyl fence surrounding the

did they challenge the

0f the

commitment provided pursuant

t0 the

RE-24. Kents waived any right

Lot 4 When they failed to notify Fitzpatricks pursuant t0 the RE-24 that

t0 challenge title t0

required: “If

title

Pond Easement, nor

BUYER does not so obiect, BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions

title.” (R., p.

138) (emphasis added).

The Kents never raised an

issue about the

title

commitment or

the condition of title to Lot

4 prior to closing as required by the RE-24. Rather, the Kents closed the transaction, and they did
so subject t0 the Easement Agreement.

property “free from

all

Their Warranty

encumbrances except those

subject and those made, suffered or done
reservations, easements, right(s) 0f

by

to

Which

15,

2017,

when

this

conveyance

is

all

expressly

(R., p. 173)

When the Kents executed the RE-24 and

the transaction closed, the Kents could have objected to the

They

Agreement was

and they began destroying the improvements

challenge would have been

made

Easement

they unilaterally determined that the Easement

not.

sat silently until

made

existing patent

way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances.”

Agreement, but they did
invalid,

they were taking the

set out that

the Grantee; and subiect to

(emphasis added). At any time from December 15, 2016

March

Deed

prior to closing as required

Pond Easement.

in the

by the RE-24,

If a

the Fitzpatricks could

have instructed the closing title company t0 amend the warranty deed to include the Pond Easement
reservation, or better

still,

the Fitzpatricks could have elected not t0 close at

all.

The

Fitzpatricks

were not given the courtesy ofnotice of an issue related t0 the Easement Agreement that they could
have addressed prior

The Kents

t0 closing.

actions fall squarely Within the exception set out in Hensel.

Thus, the Kents

should be estopped from attempting to extinguish the equitable servitude, the Easement

Agreement, from the

title

t0
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Lot

4.

Like

it

did With restrictive covenants, the District Court

dismissed the Fitzpatricks’ argument regarding equitable servitudes and estoppel in a footnote (R.,
p. 278), despite

it

being fully briefed With a verbal exchange with the District Court during oral

argument. (TL, Vol.

Memorandum

I,

p. 32,

4-17). Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court’s

Decision granting the Kents’ Motion and denying the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion.

Under these circumstances,
4.

11.

the Fitzpatricks, not the Kents, are entitled t0 the relief they sought.

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Applv

The Fitzpatricks did not merge title to Lots
t0 the case at bar.

Because the

is

no dispute

and 4, thus the merger doctrine does not apply

District Court failed t0 recognize the

doctrine, the District Court erroneously

There

3

found that merger of title voided the Easement Agreement.

that in Idaho, the doctrine

easement acquires an ownership

and the land beneﬁtted by the easement come
destroyed and the easement

(2013).3 There

is

also

is

n0 dispute

0f merger applies where the holder of an

interest in the servient estate.

1115, 1122, 739 P.2d 415, 421 (Ct. App. 1987, n. 4).2

is

many exceptions t0 the merger

into

common

extinguished. Ulrich

that the only

When

v.

MacCaskill

v.

Ebbert, 112 Idaho

the land burdened

by

the easement

ownership, the need for the easement

Bach, 155 Idaho 249, 308 P.3d 1232

two Idaho cases

relied

on by the

District

Court for

the applicability of the merger doctrine, MacCaskill and Ulrich, did not actually discuss the merger

doctrine in depth, as neither case had
the state of the law

any exceptions

on

that

common

ownership

very narrow issue 0f merger.

t0 the doctrine

of merger, so

facts.4

They both merely

stated in dicta

Thus, Idaho courts have not discussed

this case presents

an issue of ﬁrst impression for

this

Court. In contrast, other jurisdictions have clearly stated that while the doctrine of merger applies

t0

easement cases, there are

2

many exceptions

t0 the general rule.

This is not the case at bar. Fitzpatricks did not acquire Lot 4 after the Easement Agreement was recorded, therefore the
easement was not extinguished by operation of law.
3
Similar to MaCaskill, the language 0f Ulrich does not apply t0 this case.
4
The District Court also cited t0 Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406 (1961) t0 support Ulrich, but a review of
Davis does not reveal any discussion about the legal applicability of the doctrine of merger.
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The United

States

Supreme Court just recently outlined a

test to

determine

0f merger applies to separate parcels owned by a single owner. In Murr

_, 137 S.Ct.
As

v.

if the doctrine

Wisconsin, 582 U.S.

1933 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held:

makes

no single consideration can supply the
Instead, courts must consider a
number of factors. These include the treatment 0f the land under state and local
law; the physical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the
regulated land. The endeavor should determine Whether reasonable expectations
about property ownership would lead a landowner t0 anticipate that his holdings
would be treated as one parcel, 0r, instead, as separate tracts. The inquiry is
obj ective, and the reasonable expectations at issue derive from background customs
and the Whole 0f our legal tradition. (citations omitted).
the foregoing discussion

clear,

exclusive test for determining the denominator.

First, courts

should give substantial weight to the treatment ofthe land, in particular

how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law. The reasonable expectations
0f an acquirer of land must acknowledge legitimate

restrictions affecting his or her

subsequent use and dispensation 0f the property. (citations omitted).

Second, courts must 100k t0 the physical characteristics of the landowner’s
property. These include the physical relationship 0f any distinguishable tracts, the
parcel’s topography, and the surrounding
particular,

it

or likely to

human and

ecological environment. In

may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is
become

subject to, environmental or other regulation.

subj ect to
(citations

omitted).

Third, courts should assess the value 0f the property under the challenged

ofburdened land 0n the value of other
decrease the market value of the property,

regulation, With special attention t0 the effect

Though

holdings.
the effect

may

a use restriction

be tempered

property, such as

land adds value to the remaining

by increasing privacy, expanding recreational

surrounding natural beauty.
part of the city

may

if the regulated

space, or preserving

A law that limits use of a landowner’s small lot in one

by reason 0f the landowner’s nonadjacent holdings elsewhere may

decrease the market value 0f the small lot in an unmitigated fashion. The absence

0f a special relationship between the holdings
all

the holdings as a single parcel,

challenge.

Id.,

137 S.Ct.

at

1945-46 (emphasis added).
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may counsel

against consideration of

making the restrictive law susceptible to a takings

a.

The

State

and Local

When considering the

Law
Supreme Court’s merger

ﬁrst prong of the U.S.

test,

the Court

must

consider, and give substantial weight t0, the state and local laws. Idaho statutes, county ordinances,

and

city

codes govern subdivision law in

this state.

Idaho Code sets

forth:

A11 plats situate within an ofﬁcially designated area of city impact as provided for

Code, shall be administered in accordance with the
forth in the adopted city 0r county zoning and subdivision ordinances

in section 67-6526, Idaho

provisions set

having jurisdiction.

LC.

§

50-1306. Subdivision

is

deﬁned

as:

A tract 0f land divided into ﬁve (5) 0r more lots, parcels, or sites for the purpose of

LC.

sale or building

development, Whether immediate 0r future;

may

own

adopt their

Cities 0r counties

deﬁnition of subdivision in lieu of this deﬁnition.

§ 50-1301(17).

The Ada County Zoning Ordinance

also identiﬁes speciﬁc rules for subdivisions.

The

ordinances set forth:

A. Subdivision In Unincorporated Areas:

This

chapter

subdivision 0f all property Within the unincorporated area
as

may be modiﬁed by title

shall

apply to the

ofAda County except

9 0f this code.

B. Unlawful:
1.

It

shall

be unlawful to make a subdivision of property

until

the

requirements of this chapter are satisﬁed.
2.

N0

plat 0r

any instrument passing

title

t0

any portion 0f a

plat shall

be

offered for recording unless approved in accord with the regulations of this
title.

3.

N0 building permit shall be issued 0n any property being considered in the
subdivision process until: a) the ﬁnal plat has been recorded, b) assessor’s

numbers have been assigned, and c) all required public
improvements have been constructed and approved by the appropriate
authority or a surety agreement and a performance bond have been
submitted t0 and approved by the director.

parcel

Ada County Code

§ 8-6-2.

Likewise, subdivision lots Within the City 0f Eagle can only be
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modiﬁed

or

merged by

engaging in the subdivision and amendment process through the City of Eagle. Eagle City Code,
Sections 9-2-1 through 9-2-8.

The Code

for the City

of Eagle includes the following relevant

deﬁnitions:

LOT:

A parcel,

plot, tract, 0r other land area

of sufﬁcient size to meet

minimum

zoning requirements for use, coverage and area, and created by subdivision for sale,
transfer, 0r lease, and t0 provide such yards and other open spaces as are herein
required.

VARIANCE: A

modiﬁcation 0f the requirements of

this title as to lot size, lot

coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard, rear yard, setbacks, or other ordinance
provisions affecting the size 0r shape of a structure or the placement ofthe structure

upon lots, or the size of lots. A variance shall not be considered a right or special
privilege but mav be granted t0 an applicant onlv upon a showing 0f undue
hardship because 0f characteristics of the site and the variance is not in conﬂict
With the public interest.
Eagle City Code

§

9-1-6 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, the
the lots Without going

Widgeon Lakes Subdivision

Plat Notes prohibit

back through the subdivision process. The

any further changes

to

plat states:

1. BUILDING SETBACKS AND DIMENSIONAL STANDARDS IN THIS
SUBDIVISION SHALL BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE
ZONING REGULATIONS OF ADA COUNTY.

2.

ANY RESUBDIVISION OF

THIS PLAT SHALL

CONFORM TO THE

APPLICABLE ZONING REGULATIONS IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF
RESUBDIVISION.
(R., p. 123).

Additionally, the

member per lot.

(R., p.

of Widgeon Lakes make clear that each

2 1 5). Finally, the

of interests in Widgeon Lakes.

Under

CCRs

28

or severance

(R., p. 228).

Ada County

lots are all separate

and

determining Whether the doctrine 0f merger applies.
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has a separate

CCRs restrict any lot splitting, partitioning,

the current Idaho Code, the

Eagle Code, Widgeon Lakes

lot

Subdivision Ordinance, and the City of

distinct,

The

and must be treated as such When

State of California agrees With this

proposition in Stell

v.

Jay Hales Dev. C0.,

11 Cal.

Appl

4th

1214 (Ca. Ct. App. 1992), holding that

merger does not necessarily happen by operation of law. The court held:
[The City] ordinance “permits merger of contiguous lots held by the same owner if
one of the two parcels is not developed and was ‘not created in compliance with
applicable laws and ordinances in effect at the time of

“permit” merger,

its

creation.”’

While

that

does not indicate an intent on the part 0f the city
may
t0 bypass the notice and hearing provisions of California’s Subdivision Map Act
concernlng merger.
ordinance

Id., 11

it

Cal.App.4th at 1225-26.

The Kents
another, the

title

incorrectly assert that

t0 those separate

the Idaho Code, the

Ada County

and

by owning two subdivision

distinct lots

lots

Which

are adj acent t0 one

have merged. This proposition

is

Subdivision Ordinance, and the City 0f Eagle Code.

contrary t0 the rules recorded against the

Widgeon Lakes

lots in the

contrary to

It is

further

CCRS. Furthermore, no

evidence was provided in the record t0 indicate that the merger would be acceptable under any
state 0r local law, or

under the CCRS. Thus, in

this case, all

of the relevant

state

and local laws

prevent merger as an operation 0f law, and instead, in order t0 merge, the subdivision process must

be complied with.
b.

The Physical

Characteristics of the Propertv

The second prong 0f the U.S. Supreme Court merger test requires
100k t0 the physical characteristics of the property to determine
in this factor is

Whether the property has any distinguishable

that the

Court then must

if merger is appropriate.

tracts.

Murr, 137 S.Ct.

at

Included

1946.

In this case, the physical characteristics 0f Lots 3 and 4 d0 not support treatment as a uniﬁed

parcel.

Both

T0

the contrary,

Widgeon Lakes Subdivision

lots are already

lots are residential lots in a residential subdivision,

designated in separate

tracts.

each allowing a building permit for one

residences The fact that the physical property lines had been drawn in 1996 with the recordation

5

This

is

evidenced by the fact that both the Fitzpatricks and the Kents have constructed residences on their respective
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lots.

map

0f a plat

indicates that each lot

residences t0 be constructed on each

member

has one

for the

rules, Lots 3

also

conﬁrm this by establishing

and the

lots,

that

each

lot

cannot be further severed,

lots

zoning ordinances, the CCRS, and

at the

lots

for separate treatment allowing for separate

association,

and 4 could only be used as residential

combination of these

to force the

The CCRs

lot.

homeowners’
Looking

subdivided, or amended.

was intended

all

other applicable

thus the merger doctrine

would not apply

by operation 0f law.

The Value 0f the Propertv

c.

The

third

prong 0f the U.S. Supreme Court merger test provides

that the

Court must ﬁthher

look to the value 0f the property as merged and unmerged as a factor. If the value 0f the property
is

best

occurs

when merged,
by the

lots”

n0

were

137 S.Ct.

may support their treatment

set forth

combined

Id.,

into

as

on summary judgment

The

one parcel.

If

added value

Id.

to indicate that Lots 3

one indistinct parcel. Thus,

this

and 4

Court should not deem

way 0r another for purposes of the merger doctrine.

fourth prong of the U.S.

Supreme Court merger test relates to the

intent

of a landowner.

should determine Whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead

a landowner to anticipate that his property would be treated as one parcel,

tracts.

1949.

at

Reasonable Expectations About Property Ownership

d.

test

facts

in value if

the parcels’ values one

The

should be considered.

combination, this

In this case,

would increase

this factor

Id.,

137 S.Ct.

at

or, instead, as separate

1945. Several jurisdictions have already applied a test similar to Murr,

considering the intent 0n behalf of the landowner t0 determine if merger occurred. In Washington

State, for

example, the doctrine of merger

exceptions t0

its

The exception

application.

t0 the doctrine
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Radnovich
of merger

v.

is

is

disfavored both at law and in equity, and there are

Nuzhat, 104 W11. App. 800, 805, 16 P.3d 687 (2001).

explained:

compel a merger of estates where a party in Whom the two
interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, 0r Where it would
be inimical to the interest 0f the party in whom the several estates have united,
nor will they recognize a claim of merger where to do so would prejudice the
rights of innocent third persons.

The

Id.

courts will not

(Emphasis added).
Pennsylvania has employed similar logic in Schwoyer

The merger doctrine exception of intent

(1957).

is

v.

Smith, 388 P. 637, 131 A.2d 385

explained:

common law an easement was held to be extinguished When title to the
dominant and servient lands came into the hands 0f the same person. “N0 man”, it
was said, “can have an easement in his own land”, and the easement was deemed
to have been swallowed up in a “merger” 0f the two estates. Zerbey v. Allan, 215
Early in the

587 (1906). However, “merger is a technical rule at best and
so, even though two rights become united in one person, a court of equity Will keep
them separated if that is required bV an outstanding claim of a third party, or is
necessary in View 0f the proprietor’s own situation.” 1 Glenn, Mortgages, 288
[the outstanding interest now
(1943). In short, “If there is no reason for keeping
acquired], then equity will in the absence of anV declaration 0f [the owner’s]
Pa. 383, 387, 64 A.

intention, destroy

it,

but if there

is

any reason for keeping

it

alive,

such as the

George Jesse] in
294 Pa. 221,
224-25, 144 A. 91 (1928); Carrow v. Headley, 155 Pa. 96, 97, 25 A. 889 (1893); II
American Law 0f Property, § 10.43 (1952); Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 791
existence of another encumbrance, equity will not destroy

Adams

v.

it.”

Angel], 5 Ch. D. 634, 645 (1877). See also Hurst

v.

Sir

Spotts,

(5th ed. 1941). Accordingly, Pennsylvania has long held t0 the doctrine that an

easement may remain unaffected by unity of estates, or Viewed differently, revive
upon separation, if a “valid and legitimate purpose” Will be subserved thereby.
McClure v. Monongahela Southern Land C0., 263 Pa. 368, 375, 107 A. 386 (1919).

Schwoyer
Cottone

v.

v.

Smith, 388 Pa. 637, 641, 131 A.2d 385, 387 (1957) (emphasis added).

See also

Zoning Hearing Board ofPolk Township, 954 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Pa.CmW1th. 2008)

(holding that the property owner’s intent t0 keep lots separate and distinct

is

a factor to determine

Whether the doctrine 0f merger applies).

The

intent exception is applicable to the current dispute because the Fitzpatricks did not

intend for a merger to take place and such merger

would be inimical

defeats the purpose 0f the creation of the express easement

APPELLANT’S BRIEF, Page

31

to the Fitzpatricks

Which was

because

to reserve a portion

it

0f Lot

4 for the Fitzpatricks’ enjoyment and use of the pond. Dennis Fitzpatrick attested, “my wife and
I, as trustees of The Fitzpatrick Trust, never intended for Lots 3 and 4 to merge or for title to
merge.” (R., p. 189). This fact was not contested, it was simply not considered by the District
Court.
This exception is also applicable because a merger would prejudice the rights of innocent
third parties, namely, the City of Eagle, and the other homeowners in Widgeon Lakes. To accept
merger by operation of law would deprive residents of the City of Eagle and homeowners in
Widgeon Lakes the opportunity to oppose a re-subdivision of Widgeon Lakes. To accomplish
merger, the state and local laws require a formal application and hearing process for a lot line
adjustment. It is undisputed that Lots 3 and 4 are subject to the Widgeon Lakes Subdivision Plat,
the CCRs, and subject to state and local subdivision rules and requirements. Because a subdivision
plat exists, title to these plats cannot merge without first going through the platting process with
the City of Eagle and Ada County.
The Kents cite to cases from Montana and New Hampshire to support their position that
the merger doctrine is applicable to extinguish the Easement Agreement. Given this is an issue of
first impression in Idaho, the Fitzpatricks urge this Court to rely on the precedent set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Murr, to determine whether merger occurs as an operation of law or
whether exceptions to the general rule apply. Further, two jurisdictions within the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Washington and California, both require an intent analysis before allowing
merger as an operation of law. See Radnovich, supra and Stell, supra. Idaho should follow suit.
If this Court adopts the Kents’ narrow application of common law without considering
exceptions, it becomes legally challenging to create many different types of easements, covenants,
and equitable servitudes. For example, if the Court adopts the argument that an easement cannot

APPELLANT’S BRIEF, Page 32

be created on property one owns, without exception, that would then completely eliminate the legal
ability t0 create conservation easements, shared irrigation easements, well user agreements, septic

easements, covenants, conditions and restrictions, and other related encumbrances 0n real
property. This case does not involve an ingress and egress easement over one parcel 0f property

t0 another.

It

involves two separate and distinct subdivision

encumbered by the Pond Easement Which serves

new merger

test

whereby one

lot is

as an easement, a restrictive covenant,

equitable servitude beneﬁting Lot 3, burdening Lot 4.

doctrine of merger under the

lots,

now
and

Therefore, this Court should analyze the

adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, and further

recognize the intent exception that has been applied in neighboring jurisdictions Within the Ninth
Circuit.

When balancing the equities in this case and considering the impact it would have 0n other

easements, restrictive covenants, and equitable servitudes, this Court should

ﬁnd that

the doctrine

of merger does have exceptions and Idaho courts should be charged With recognizing the same.
After doing so, this Court should conclude that the Easement Agreement
valid since Lots 3 and 4 were not

common

fully enforceable

and

merged by operation 0f law simply because they were under

ownership.

5.

The Kents had Record Notice 0f the Easement Agreement

At

all

times relevant t0 this case, Kents had constructive and actual notice 0f the

encumbrances over Lot
meaning,

is

if a

document

the recording.

The

4,

is

including the Easement Agreement. Idaho

recorded against real property,

all

is

a notice recording state,

subsequent purchasers take subj ect to

statute reads:

Every conveyance 0f

real property

acknowledged 0r proved, and certiﬁed, and

recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is ﬁled With the recorder for record,
is constructive notice 0f the contents thereof t0 subsequent purchasers and
mortgag(e)es.
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acknowledged or proved, and certiﬁed, and
recorded as prescribed by law, and Which is executed by one Who thereafter
acquires an interest in said real property by a conveyance Which is constructive
notice as aforesaid, is, from the time such latter conveyance is ﬁled with the
recorder for record, constructive notice 0f the contents thereof to subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees.
Every conveyance of

LC.

§ 55-81

interest is

(2001).

1.

real property

The primary purpose of the recording

claimed in real property. Kalange

A

person

who

v.

statutes is to give notice to others that

Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195, 30 P.3d 970, 973

records such an instrument

not required to give additional notice to

is

anyone Who deals with other persons about the property. Eastwood

Ca,
is

11 Idaho 195, 81 P. 382,

because “[0]ne claiming

estate,

title,

383 (1905).

title

He

0r she

v.

may rely 0n the

t0 lands is chargeable

Standard Mines

constructive notice. Id. This

essential link in his chain

and also with notice 0f such matters as might be learned by inquiry Which the

made

it

& Milling

with notice of every matter affecting the

Which appears 0n the face of any recorded deed forming an

instruments

recitals in

P.

Idaho Code identiﬁes

0f

such

a duty to pursue.” Kalange, 136 Idaho at 195, 30 P.3d at 973 (citing Glover

Brown, 32 Idaho 426, 184

an

v.

649 (1919)).

When one can be

a

bona ﬁde purchaser

as follows:

Every grant or conveyance 0f an estate in real property is conclusive against the
grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under him, except a
purchaser or encumbrancer, Who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration,
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is ﬁrst duly
recorded.

LC.

§ 55-606.

A bona ﬁde purchaser is one Who takes real property by paying valuable consideration and
in

good

faith, i.e.,

without knowing of adverse claims. Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc.

123 Idaho 862, 866, 853 P.2d 607, 611 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing LC. § 55-606;
theory behind the rule

t0 protect innocent purchasers

is

unencumbered interests.

Id.
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and

t0 allow

them

v.

Burt,

§ 55-812).

The

t0 obtain

and convey

Generally, a person must take property through a conveyance in order

to

be afforded the protective

instrument in writing

status

of a bona ﬁde purchaser.

by Which an

LC.

A conveyance includes “every

estate or interest in real property is created,

mortgaged, or encumbered, or by Which the
wills.”

Id.

title

t0

any

real property

may be

alienated,

affected, except

§ 55-813.

Furthermore, one cannot be a good faith purchaser

when

a reasonable investigation of the

property would have revealed the existence of the conﬂicting claim in question.

Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 221, 526 P.2d 178, 181 (1974).

Langroz'se

v.

A person is not a bona ﬁde purchaser ifhe

purchased the property With sufﬁcient knowledge t0 put a reasonably prudent person 0n inquiry.

Adams

v.

“one

that

Anderson, 142 Idaho 208, 213, 127 P.3d 111, 113 (2005).

who

purchases land expressly subject to an easement, or with notice, actual or

constructive, that

Checketts

v.

it is

burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subj ect t0 the easement.”

Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944).

In this case, the Kents

MLS
was

listing, the

had actual notice of the Easement Agreement

t0 the

was duly recorded

encumbrances 0n

had such knowledge, they took the land

Because the Kents had actual knowledge of the Easement Agreement,

subject to the easement.

it

as identiﬁed in the

RE-24, and the Warranty Deed. The Kents were aware that the purchase 0f Lot 4

subject to an existing easement and because they

and because

Idaho courts have long held

prior t0 their purchase of Lot 4, they took their property subject

that easement.

The Kents’ Warranty Deed

states, “subject t0 all existing

patent reservations, easements, right(s) 0f way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and
applicable building codes, laws and regulations, general taxes and assessments, including

irrigation

and

There

utility

is

assessments

no dispute

(if any) for the current year. .”

that the

.

(R., p. 173).

Easement Agreement was duly recorded. There

dispute that the Warranty

Deed included
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all

is

further

no

easements of record. The District Court was charged

to decide this matter as a matter

in this case requires the

of equity, as

Court t0 look

this

Court

at the actions

is

also so charged. Balancing the equities

and inactions 0f the parties

t0 determine

Whether 0r not t0 validate the Easement Agreement as an encumbrance against Lot 4 in favor 0f
Lot

3.

The Kents had
and

in the purchase

after the sale

argued
that the

The

The

v.

t0

Lot

facts that

by Fitzpatricks. Accordingly,

Fitzpatricks

is

and

4,

were disregarded by the
this

to the

District Court despite being

Court should reverse the District Court and ﬁnd

binding 0n the Kents and Lot 3 as a matter 0f law.

Have a Right

t0

Maintain the Easement
and improve the Pond Easement pursuant

Easement Agreement. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held

v.

Pond Easement

failed t0 say anything to the Fitzpatricks until

Fitzpatricks have a right to maintain, repair,

owner has the
Bedke

documents

Easement Agreement
6.

t0 the

sale

knowledge of the Easement Agreement, agreed

had closed, undisputed

length

at

actual

that

an easement

right t0 enter the servient estate in order t0 maintain, repair 0r protect the easement.

Pickett

Ranch and Sheep

C0., 143 Idaho 36, 41, 137 P.3d 423,

Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 989 P.2d 276 (1999); Abbott

v.

Nampa

Idaho 544, 808 P.2d 1289 (1991)). The general rule in Idaho

is

428 (2006)

(citing

Drew

School Dist. N0. 131, 119

that the

dominant owner 0f an

easement has the duty to maintain and repair the easement, but the servient estate has no such duty.

Gibbens

v.

Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 640, 570 P.2d 870 (1977). The Gibbens court speciﬁcally

held:

The owner 0f an easement has

the right and duty t0 maintain, repair, and protect
McMurtrey, 97 Idaho 416, 546 P.2d 62 (1976); Rehwalt v.
American Falls Reservoir District N0. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137 (1976); City
ofBellevue v. Daly, supra. The owner 0f the servient estate has no duty to maintain
the easement. Suitts v. McMurtrey, supra; Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 119 P.2d
266 (1941). This duty requires that the easement owner maintain the easement so
as not t0 create an additional burden on the servient estate. In City ofBellevue, this
Court held that it was the obligation of the easement owner t0 fence and protect the
easement. The Court reasoned that the owner 0f the land subject t0 the easement
should not be deprived 0f the use 0f his land as pasturage because 0f the existence
the easement. Suitts
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v.

of the easement. The Court also held that it was not the servient landowner’s duty
to protect the easement. It would seem proper in this case to require the respondent,
the owners of the dominant estate, to absorb the cost of constructing and
maintaining any gates necessary to protect the easement and to allow the appellants
reasonable use of their land as pasturage.
Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 640, 570 P.2d 870 (1977).
In this case, the Easement Agreement actually sets forth the rights and obligations of the
servient estate, Lot 4. As referenced above, the Easement Agreement gives the owners of Lot 3
the right to “maintain, repair, and improve the Easement Real Property.” At the time the Kents
acquired Lot 4, the Pond Easement was already being maintained by the Fitzpatricks. The
Fitzpatricks constructed the vinyl fence surrounding the Pond Easement in 1997, almost twenty
(20) years prior to the Kents taking ownership of Lot 4. The vinyl fence was still in its original
constructed location at the time the Fitzpatricks filed their Complaint and they have been
maintaining the Pond Easement for almost two decades. (R., p. 118). As a courtesy to the Kents,
the Fitzpatricks installed a gate on the vinyl fence so the Kents could access the pond. (R., pp.
118-19). However, the Kents do not have the right to remove or destroy any of the existing
improvements on the Pond Easement.
By threatening to remove the vinyl fence and irrigation system located on the Pond
Easement, the Kents are directly violating the provisions of the Easement Agreement, as well as
long established principles of Idaho law. There are no genuine issues of material fact regarding
the status of the Pond Easement, nor are there any issues of material fact regarding the terms and
conditions of the Easement Agreement. Therefore, this Court may find as a matter of law that the
Kents cannot remove any improvements already existing within the Pond Easement.
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7.

The Kents Cannot Obstruct

The Kents
prohibited.

from

Where

Pond Easement

are trying t0 obstruct the Fitzpatricks use 0f the

Pond Easement. This

is

a servient landowner takes the land subject t0 the easement, he must refrain

interfering with the use of the easement.

723 P.2d 914, 921
is

the Fitzpatricks Use 0f the

(Ct.

App. 1986).

Boydstun Beach Ass ’n

v.

Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377,

An easement owner is entitled t0 reliefupon a showing that he

obstructed from exercising privileges granted

by an easement.

Id.

Here, the Kents are the servient landowners and they purchased Lot 4 in 2017 subject to

any easements 0f record. Prior t0 purchasing Lot

4, the

Kents had a responsibility t0 determine the

nature and scope ofthese easements that encumbered the real property. See Villager

Ass’n

v.

Idaho Power

C0,, 121

Pond Easement by placing

Condominium

Idaho 986, 829 P.2d 1335 (1992). The Kents cannot obstruct the

artiﬁcial restrictions

0n

its

use.

The Kents

are not entitled t0

impose

one-Sided easement restrictions under general principles 0f equity: “one of the fundamental
principles 0f equity

5 Idaho 79, 94,

47

is,

‘He

P. 818,

who

actual notice of the

side.

by adjacent

agreed to the Pond Easement
clearly states,

Furthermore, the

“Buyer

title

stating,

New owner Will be allowed View, but Vinyl

attached to and maintained

Which

Easement Agreement prior

Agreement disclosed the Pond Easement,

easement 0n north

ofAda

v.

Bullen Bridge C0,,

825 (1896).

The Kents were 0n
First, the Listing

asks equity must d0 equity.”’ County

Lot

4.

“This property has a recorded
fencing and pond Will remain

property.” Second, the Kents further acknowledged and

when they

is

to purchasing

entered into the

RE-24

for the purchase

of the property

aware 0f a recorded easement on the north side of the property.”

search for Lot 4 undoubtedly would have revealed the existence 0f the

recorded Easement Agreement, which was duly recorded 0n September 12, 2016, six months prior
t0 the

Kent Trust taking title
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to the property. Finally, the

Warranty Deed to the Kents clearly stated

that the property

was conveyed “subject

to all existing patent reservations, easements, right(s)

0f

way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and applicable building codes, laws and
regulations.

.

..” (R., p.

173).

A11 0fthese facts were undisputed and presented as such t0 the District Court. Accordingly,
the Fitzpatricks respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court’s

Decision, validate the Easement Agreement, and determine that

it is

Memorandum

enforceable against the Kents

as a matter of law.

8.

The Kents Failed

In their

Motion

for

to

Put Forth Disputed Facts 0n

Summary Judgment,

Summarv Judgment

the Kents failed t0 provide any afﬁdavits,

declarations, 0r evidence t0 support their Motion. Furthermore, in opposition to the Fitzpatricks’

Cross Motion, the Kents failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact t0 dispute the Cross

Motion. Rather, one declaration, the Declaration 0f Alan Kent, was proffered for the sole purpose

0f introducing a copy 0f the Widgeon Lakes Estates Declaration of Restrictive Covenants.
202-245).

The Declaration of Alan Kent contains no

allegations in the

body of

the

(R., pp.

document

addressing any 0f the allegations previously introduced by the Fitzpatricks’ declarations ﬁled in
support of their Cross Motion. (R., pp. 202-204).

The Kents cannot

rest

0n the pleadings

issues through afﬁdavits 0r declarations. Idaho

A party asserting that

alone, but rather,

must

set forth concrete factual

Rule 0f Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)

a fact cannot be or

is

states:

genuinely disputed must support

the assertion by:
(A) citing t0 particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, afﬁdavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those

made

for purposes of the

interrogatory answers, 0r other materials; 0r
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motion only), admissions,

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of
a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.
(Emphasis Added).
Idaho courts have also held that in the absence of affidavits and opposed only by an
unverified answer, summary judgment motions are essentially uncontested. Golay v. Loomis, 118
Idaho 387, 389, 797 P.2d 95, 97 (1990). With no evidence cognizable under Rule 56(c) before the
court, no facts are presented to raise a material issue of fact. Id. In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court considers only material contained in the affidavits and depositions which are
based on personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. Id. Summary judgment is
appropriate where a non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence
of an element essential to its case when it bears the burden of proof. Id.
The Kents did not set forth any factual allegations in support of their Motion, nor did they
cite to any genuine issues of material fact when opposing the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion. With no
facts set forth by the Kents, they have failed to make a sufficient showing that they were entitled
to summary judgment. Likewise, by failing to set forth any facts in opposition to the Fitzpatricks’
Cross Motion, the Cross Motion was essentially uncontested. Thus, this Court should look to the
record, the declarations filed on behalf of the Fitzpatricks, the Declaration of Alan Kent which sets
forth no material factual allegations and determine as a matter of law that no genuine issues of
material fact exist, entitling the Fitzpatricks to relief.
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V.

The

CONCLUSION

Fitzpatricks have established that there are

Easement Agreement and respective

rights

n0 genuine issues 0f fact with regard t0 the

0f the parties in

this case. Additionally, this

Court can

determine the plain meaning of the Easement Agreement as a matter of law. Therefore, based 0n
the

forgoing,

the

Fitzpatricks

respectfully ask this

Court t0 reverse the District Court’s

Memorandum Decision and conﬁrm Fitzpatricks’ easement rights over and 0n the Kents’

DATED:

property.

June 26, 2019.

PICKENS LAW,

P.A.

By

Pickens Manweiler

/s/ Terri

Terri Pickens Manweiler,

Of the Firm

Attorneysfor Plaintijfv-CounterdefendantsAppellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I,

the undersigned, certify that

foregoing to be forwarded with

all

0n June 26, 2019,

I

caused a true and correct copy 0f the

required charges prepaid,

by the method(s)

indicated below,

in accordance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, to the following person(s):

J.

Will Varin

Lawrence
Varln Wardwell LLC
242 N. 8th St., Ste. 220
Dy1_an B.

P.O.

Box 1676

D
D
D
E

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail

Facsimile

—

1.866.717. 1758

Email/iCourts

— willvarin@varinwardwell.com
dvlanlawrence(a)varinwardwell.com

Boise, ID 83701

Pickens Manweiler
Manweiler

/s/ Terri

Terri Pickens
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